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NOTES
INVITATION TO ARSON: INDIANA'S INTERPRETATION
OF ACTUAL CASH VALUE
INTRODUCTION
Arson is the cause of one-fourth to one-half of all fires and results
in more than 1,000 deaths and two billion dollars in property losses
annually.' Unfortunately, when an insurance policyholder is allowed
to recover an amount in excess of his loss, it may serve as an invita-
tion to arson. If his building is obsolete, in an undesirable location,
or unmarketable because of the economy, he may see arson as a way
out-he simply "sells" his building to the insurance company.
The amount of recovery under a basic fire insurance policy is
determined by the "actual cash value" of the destroyed property. Due
to the insurance carrier's desire to avoid bad publicity and the
policyholder's need for his money, the amount of recovery is seldom
litigated When it is, however, the court must define the phrase "ac-
tual cash value."
The Indiana Court of Appeals was called on recently to define
actual cash value.' In a very confusing opinion, the court purported
to define actual cash value as replacement cost, but actually used a
very different standard in reaching its decision. Not only might this
decision invite arson and cause increased premium rates; it may also
raise serious questions as to what standard is to be used to define
actual cash value in Indiana.
The purpose of this note is to analyze the practical effects of
the Indiana interpretation of actual cash value. After examining the
1. Karp, The "Wishbone Offense"-A Two-Pronged Attack Against Arson, 14
FORUM 205 (1978).
2. Schulman, Insurance Valuation and Adjustment of Fire Losses on Dwellings:
California Law vs. Southern California Practice, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 248,259 (1958). Note,
Valuation and Measure of Recovery Under Fire Insurance Policies, 49 COLUM. L. REV.
818, 823 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Valuation Under Fire Insurance Policies].
3. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong, - Ind.App. -, 384 N.E.2d
607 (1979).
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interpretations used in other jurisdictions, this note will suggest adop-
tion of an interpretation which avoids the problems of excess recovery
and is fair to the insurer and insured. Finally, it will urge the In-
diana Supreme Court to clarify the standard to be used in Indiana.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ACTUAL CASH VALUE
The phrase actual cash value is used in nearly all property in-
surance policies. It appears in the New York standard fire insurance
policy4 which is typical of all policies written on the basis of actual
cash value.5 The applicable provision reads:
. . .[T]his Company . . . to an amount not exceeding the
amounts above specified, does insure the Insured . . . to
the extent of actual cash value of the property at the time
of loss, but not exceeding the amount which it would cost
to repair or replace property with materials of a like kind
and quality within a reasonable time after loss ... '
If read literally, the provision is a limitation on the insurer's liability.'
The majority of courts, however, interpret the "actual cash value"
phrase as the measure of recovery s Accordingly, recovery under a
fire insurance policy is determined by the actual cash value of the
destroyed property.'
4. N.Y. INS. LAW S 168(5) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
5. This policy is used verbatim in thirty-four states and adopted with minor
variations (not relevant to this discussion) in eleven states. The forms used in
Massachusetts and Texas include the actual cash value phrase. The Minnesota form
uses "actual value" which has been held snynonomous with actual cash value. The
New York standard form was adopted as the approved policy in Indiana in 1955.
BURNS ADMIN. R. & REG. S (27-1-13-1)-i (1955). Its required use was repealed in February
1979 to allow insurers to use the new "plain-talk policies," which will continue to use
the "actual cash value" phrase. The New York standard policy may still be used as
well as any other policy submitted to and approved by the Department of Insurance.
The form used in each state and the authority under which it is required is listed
in INSUR. L. REP. (CCH) Fire & Casualty Cas. 2003-04.
6. N.Y. INS. LAW S 168(5) (McKinney Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
7. Elberon Bathing v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 77 N.J. 1, 7, 389 A.2d 439, 442
(1978); McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 176, 181, 157 N.E. 902, 904 (1928);
Lampe Market Co. v. Alliance Ins. Co., 71 S.D. 120, -, 22 N.W.2d 427, 428 (1946);
Crisp v. Security Nat'l Ins. Co., 369 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex. 1963); 44 AM. JUR. 2d In-
surance S 1636 (1969).
8. Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 392 F.2d 570, 570 (10th Cir. 1968); Wor-
chester Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Eisenberg, 147 So. 2d 575, 576 (Fla. 1962); Agoos Leather
Co. v. American & Foreign Ins. Co., 342 Mass. 603, ... 174 N.E.2d 652, 654 (1961).
9. Bonbright & Katz, Valuation of Property to Measure Fire Insurance Losses,
29 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 863 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Bonbright].
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Considerable controvery exists, however, as to the exact defini-
tion of actual cash value. Courts in various jurisdictions have developed
three basic standards to determine the actual cash value of property:"
1) fair market value;" 2) replacement cost less depreciation;' 2 and 3)
the board evidence rule. 3 While the first two are self-explanatory,
the broad evidence rule needs clarification. Under this standard the
court is not tied to any one rigid test. Rather, the court hears all
evidence relevant to the determination of the value of property, in-
cluding market value, replacement cost, depreciation, age and condi-
tion of the building, the use to which the building is put, the adap-
tability of the property to other uses, and any other factors relevant
to a determination of value. 4 While it appears the trend is toward
use of the broad evidence rule," there is no general consensus as to
which standard best accomplishes the desired end of indemnity.
The Principle of Indemnity
Since the principle of indemnity underlies all property insurance
contracts," courts have tried to develop a definition of actual cash
value that adheres to that principle. 7 According to the principle of
10. Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 711 (1958).
11. Under the fair market value standard, actual cash value is the difference
between market value immediately before and after the loss. Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court, 3 Cal. 3d 398, 475 P.2d 880, 20 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1970);, Forer v. Quincy Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 295 A.2d 247 (Me. 1972).
12. Smith v. Allemania Fire Ins. Co., 219 I1. App. 506 (1920). In the case of par-
tial loss, a minority of jurisdictions use replacement cost without allowance for deprecia-
tion. See note 68 infra.
13. Elberon Bathing v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 77 N.J. 1, 389 A.2d 439 (1978);
McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 176, 157 N.E. 902 (1928); Lampe Market
Co. v. Alliance Ins. Co., 71 S.D. 120, 22 N.W.2d 427 (1946).
14. Elberon, 77 N.J. at 11, 389 A.2d at 443-44, McAnarney, 247 N.Y. at 184, 157
N.E. at 905; Lampe, 71 S.D. at -, 22 N.W.2d at 428.
15. At least twenty-seven states have adopted the broad evidence rule in some
form. See note 111 infra.
16. This statement is limited to "open" property insurance policies, such as a
New York standard fire insurance policy. An "open" policy is one that does not set the
value of the property in the policy, but leaves the measure of loss to be determined after
the loss has occurred. The face amount of the policy is an upper limit of recovery. Bon-
bright, supra note 9, at 861. Valued policies conclusively fix the amount the insured will
recover in case of a total loss at the face value of the policy. Under replacement insurance
the insurers' liability is governed by the cost to rebuild with new materials at the time
of the loss. Both replacement insurance and valued policies may violate the principal
of indemnity by allowing a recovery in excess of actual loss.
17. 6 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE S 3823 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
APPLEMAN]; Bonbright, supra note 9, at 863; KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW S 3.1,
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indemnity, the proper measure of damages for a loss covered by fire
insurance is the sum necessary to put the insured in the same finan-
cial position he would have been in had no loss occurred."8 The ade-
quately insured person should incur neither gain nor loss by virtue
of recovery under a fire insurance policy.19 Therefore, the definition
of cash value should allow an insured to recover the value of his loss,
yet prevent him from receiving a windfall."
Recovery in excess of loss creates a "moral hazard."21 If the in-
sured is allowed to recover an amount greatly in excess of the pro-
perty's real worth, it tempts him to cause the loss himself or fail to
guard against it. For instance, an insured may own a building which
has a high replacement cost, but due to a deteriorating neighborhood,
its value may be much less. It may be impossible to operate a business
profitably at the present location, rent the building to another party,
or sell the building without a loss. If the insured is allowed to recover
an amount in excess of the true commercial value of the building,
such recovery becomes an incentive for arson. The owner may decide
that he would be better off if his property burned down.
While indemnity allows an insured to recover the value of the
destroyed property, it does not require that he always recover enough
to replace the property. To suggest that it does confuses indemnity
with restitution.' Indemnity requires only an amount, in money, which
will compensate for the actual loss. A recovery sufficient to replace
the property may often result in a windfall for the insured and, thus,
violate the principle of indemnity. 3 If a fifty-year-old house is
3.9 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KEETON]. See Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q.B.D. 380,386(1883):
The very foundation, in my opinion, of every rule which has been applied
to insurance law is this, namely, that the contract of insurance contained
in a marine or fire policy is a contract of indemnity only, and that this con-
tract means that the assured, in case of a loss against which the policy has
been made, shall be fully indemnified, but shall never be more than fully
indemnified. That is the fundamental principle of insurance, and if ever a
proposition is brought forward which is at variance with it, that is to say,
which either will prevent the assured from obtaining a full indemnity, or
which will give to the assured more than a full indemnity, that proposition
must certainly be wrong.
18. APPLEMAN, supra note 17; Borden v. General Ins. Co., 157 Neb. 98, __ , 59
N.W.2d 141, 147 (1953).
19. Mercer v. St. Paul Fire Ins. Co., 318 So. 2d 111, 115 (La. App. 1975).
20. KEETON, supra note 17, at S 3.lb.
21. Elberon, 77 N.J. at 8, 389 A.2d at 442; Bonbright, supra note 9; REIGEL
& MILLER, INSURANCE PRINICIPLES AND PRACTICES, 358-59 (3d ed. 1947).
22. Bonbright, supra note 9, at 859.
23. KEETON, supra note 17; Elberon, 77 N.J. at 8,389 A.2d at 442; Braddock v. Mem-
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destroyed by fire, the loss to the insured is not equivalent to the
cost of a new house. Restitution may require a new house, but in-
demnity requires only that he receive the value of a fifty-year-old
house.2 ' Any other interpretation would allow the insured to receive
a windfall and may encourage arson. Since fire insurance policies are
contracts of indemnity, it is important to keep these principles in mind
when analyzing the Indiana interpretation of actual cash value.
The Definition of Actual Cash Value in Indiana
Until 1979, Indiana courts had not expressly adopted one stan-
dard which would determine the actual cash value of the destroyed
property. 5 It can be argued, however, that the Indiana Court of Ap-
peals adopted the market value test by implication in Atlas Construc-
tion Co. v. Indiana Insurance Co.' In Atlas, the court was asked to
invalidate an appraisal award based on fair market value. It held that
fair market value was a proper method for determining actual cash
value in making an appraisal." In dicta, the court stated that actual
cash value had always meant fair market value in Indiana, citing a
California decision28 which expressly rejected the replacement cost
phis Fire Ins. Corp., - Tenn. - - 493 S.W.2d 453, 468 (1973). But cf Harper
v. Pennsylvania Mut. Ins. Co., 199 F. Supp. 663, 664 (E.D. Va. 1961); Fedas v. Insurance
Co. of Pa., 300 Pa. 555, __, 151 A. 285, 288 (1930); Farmers Mut. Protective Ass'n v.
Amerek, 404 S.W.2d 599, 600 (Tex. 1966).
24. Note, An Insurance Policy Providing for Replacement of Fire Damaged Struc-
tures with New Materials, 96 U. PA. L. REV. 841 (1948). It may be argued that recovery
insufficient to replace the house entirely fails to indemnify the insured completely. But
KEETON, supra note 17, at S 3.1b states that partial reimbursement does not offend the prin-
ciple of indemnity. Generally, property insurance does not reimburse the insured for
loss of profits, rents, business, or possible liability for failure to comply with contracts
caused by property loss. E.g., Kingsley v. Spofford, 298 Mass. 469, __ , 11 N.E.2d 487,
491 (1937); Hewins v. London Assurance Corp., 184 Mass. 177, 179, 68 N.E. 62, 63 (1903).
If a contract of indemnity requires complete recovery for all losses incurred, these in-
cidental losses would necessarily be covered. Keeton states that the principle of indemnity
requires only that recovery not exceed loss, not that the benefit be no less than the loss.
25. In Wea Township v. Cloyd, 46 Ind. App. 49, 54, 91 N.E. 959, 961 (1910), the
court held that actual cash value was the fair market at the time of loss. However, the
court was not interpreting an insurance contract but rather determining the value of
sheep destroyed by wild dogs.
26. 160 Ind. App. 33, 309 N.E.2d 810 (1974). This case has been cited for holding
that Indiana used the fair market standard. Comment, Arson Fraud: Criminal Prosecu-
tion and Insurance Law, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 541, 572 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Arson
Fraud].
27. Atlas Constr. Co. v. Indiana Ins. Co., 160 Ind. App. 33, 39, 309 N.E.2d 810,
814 (1974).
28. Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 398, 475 P.2d 880, 20 Cal. Rptr.
608 (1970).
1982]
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standard and instead adopted the fair market value standard. While
the court suggested that it might acknowledge the broad evidence
rule when the question was properly before the court, the definition
of "actual cash value" was not itself an issue in the case.'
The definition of "actual cash value" was one of the issues before
the court in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong. In that case a
100-year-old rental house insured for $15,000 under a New York stan-
dard fire insurance policy was damaged by fire. The house had been
remodeled at various times, with some remodeling done as recently
as a year and a half before the fire. Both parties agreed that the
cost to repair the house with new material was $8,700, but they
disagreed as to what the amount of recovery should be. The insurance
carrier argued that actual cash value was the replacement cost less
depreciation. The insured argued the loss should be measured by the
cost required to replace the damaged property. The trial court in-
structed the jury that the insurance policy required the insurer to
pay the full direct loss, within the limits of the policy, and that the
policy contained no provisios which required or authorized a reduc-
tion of coverage below the amount of the full direct loss.3 The jury
awarded the entire cost to repair, $8,700. The appellate court upheld
the instruction, stating that "the phrase actual cash value, within the
context of the fire insurance policy in the case at bar, means an
amount sufficient to restore, repair, or replace the property
destroyed." 2 Thus, the standad to be used in measuring actual cash
value in Indiana is replacement cost without allowance for depreciation.
Equating actual cash value with replacement cost violates the
principle of indemnity in many cases, by allowing recovery in excess
of loss.' As noted earlier, if the insured recovers the cost of a new
house when his fifty-year-old house burns, he receives a windfall, and
is, in fact, encouraged to cause the loss himself or take fewer precau-
tions to prevent the destruction.
For these reasons, it is almost universally accepted that deprecia-
tion must be considered in determining the amount of recovery.' The
29. Atlas, 160 Ind. App. at 39-40, 309 N.E.2d at 814.
30. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, - Ind. App. -, 384 N.E.2d 607 (1979).
31. Id. at __, 384 N.E.2d at 616.
32. Id. at -' 384 N.E.2d at 615.
33. See note 23, supra and accompanying text.
34. Bonbright, supra note 9, at 878,879. Valuation Under Fire Insurance Policies,
supra note 2, at 823, 826 n.60. "If the principle of indemnity be adhered to depreciation
must be considered in loss adjustment so the insured will not receive the equivalent
of a new building for the loss of an old one."
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minority of jurisdictions which use the replacement cost standard
without allowance for depreciation35 limit its use to partial loss cases.'
However, unless use of the replacement cost standard is limited to
those partial loss cases where repair or replacement with new
materials does not significantly increase the value of the property,
its use will violate the principle of indemnity in many partial loss
cases also."
The Travelers decision did not limit the interpretation of actual
cash value in any way. The court held that "actual cash value, within
the context of the fire insurance policy in the case at bar means an
amount sufficient to restore, repair or replace the property
destroyed."38 The insurance policy in Travelers was a basic fire in-
surance policy. Therefore, the replacement cost standard would seem
to apply to all losses covered by a standard fire insurance policy,
whether that requires replacement of three shingles on a fifty-year-
old roof or complete replacement of a fifty-year-old house.
Despite the definite language in Travelers regarding the defini-
tion of actual cash value, there may still be confusion as to what the
standard actually is. It may be argued that the court actually applied
the broad evidence rule rather than the replacement cost standard
in reaching the decision. The court considered evidence of replace-
ment cost, depreciation, extent of remodeling, expert opinion of market
value, and the use and functional efficiency of the property. Considera-
tion of such evidence is consistent with use of the broad evidence
rule, but most of it would be excluded if replacement cost was the
sole measure of recovery. The broad evidence rule does not preclude
use of the replacement cost standard where it would achieve indem-
nity. However, if the court were truly using the broad evidence rule,
they would not announce that the replacement cost standard applied
to all losses covered by a standard fire insurance policy as the
Travelers court did. This raises serious questions as to what inter-
pretation of actual cash value is to be used in future Indiana cases.
The full impact of the Travelers decision will be more readily
understood after a discussion of the interpretations of actual cash value
used in other jurisdictions. All of the interpretations are considered
in light of their ability to achieve indemnity.
INTERPRETATIONS OF ACTUAL CASH VALUE
Fair Market Value
Some courts have defined actual cash value as "fair market
value." Under this standard, recovery is determined by the difference
19821
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between the fair market value of the property immediately before
and after the loss."0 If there is not an established market, the market
value is the amount a prospective purchaser and a willing seller would
hypothetically agree on in fair negotiations."
The fair market value standard has been criticized, with the ma-
jority of courts rejecting it as the sole measure of recovery in real
property cases.42 They argue that a building has no recognized market
value because each building is unique and incapable of replacement
in any market.' Furthermore, buildings independent of the land on
which they stand are never the subject of market sales." A building
and land together may have a joint value entirely different from the
value of each when considered separately.45 Because a building may
be adapted to a single use, its value on the market reflects its lack
of adaptation to another use. In such cases market value fails to reflect
the full value of the property to the owner, and therefore, fails to
indemnify the owner for his actual loss. ' Under the fair market value
35. Valuation Under Fire Insurance Policies, supra note 2, at 826. See note
68 infra.
36. A partial loss is one where the building is not so badly damaged by fire
that its identity or specific character is destroyed and the remaining part could be substan-
tially restored to its original condition. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Ramey,
245 Ky. 367, __ , 53 S.W.2d 560, 563 (1932).
37. Elberon, 77 N.J. at 8, 389 A.2d at 442; Braddock, __ Tenn. at __ , 493
S.W.2d at 468; Howland, Depreciation and Partial Losses, INS. L.J. 685, 688-89 (1953);
Williams, The Principle of Indemnity: A Critical Analysis, INS. L.J. 471,472 (1960); Valua-
tion Under Fire Insurance Policies, supra note 2, at 826 n.60.
38. Travelers, __ Ind. App. at __, 384 N.E.2d at 616.
39. Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 711, 715 (1958).
40. Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 398, 475 P.2d 880, 90 Cal. Rptr.
608 (1970); Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Little, 384 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1980); Shield v. Insurance
Co. v. Kemp, 117 Ga. App. 538, 160 S.E.2d 915 (1968); Forer v. Quincy Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 295 A.2d 247 (Me. 1972); Tinsley v. Aetna Ins. Co., 199 Mo. App. 693, 205 S.W. 78
(1918); Grantham v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 174 Neb. 790, 119 N.W.2d 519 (1963); Clouse
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 152 Neb. 230, 40 N.W.2d 820 (1950); Butler v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 64 N.E. 764, 256 N.W. 214 (1934); Mew v. J. & C. Galleries, Inc., 564 S.W.2d
377 (Tex. 1978); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Striklen, 556 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1977).
41. Forer, 295 A.2d at 249; Butler, 64 N.D. at __ , 256 N.W. at 219.
42. Valuation Under Fire Insurance Policies, supra note 2, at 820; State Ins. Co.
v. Taylor, 14 Colo. 499, 510-11, 24 P. 333, 337 (1890); Smith, 219 Ill. App. at 512; Britven
v. Occidental Ins. Co., 234 Iowa 682, 686, 13 N.W.2d 791, 793 (1944); Elberon, 77 N.J. at
10, 389 A.2d at 443, McAnarney, 247 N.Y. at 17, 157 N.E. at 903-04; Merchants Ins. Co.
v. Frick, 5 Ohio Dec. 47 (1873); Third Nat'l Bank v. American Ins. Co., 27 Tenn. App.
249, __, 178 S.W.2d 915, 924 (1943).
43. McAnarney, 247 N.Y. at 183, 157 N.E. at 902.
44. Elberon, 77 N.J. at 10, 389 A.2d at 443; Smith, 219 11. App. at 512.
45. Smith, 219 Ill. App. at 512.
46. Bonbright, supra note 9, at 880.
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standard, if there is no market demand for a property, theoretically
it would have no market value and there would be no loss if the pro-
perty was destroyed. 7 For all of these reasons, the fair market value
standard often fails to achieve indemnity in real property cases and
should not be used as the sole measure of recovery.
Replacement Cost Less Depreciation
Actual cash value is defined as replacement cost less deprecia-
tion in several jurisdictions.'" This is the cost to replace a building
with new material minus a deduction for physical depreciation." The
advantages of this standard are definiteness and ease of determining
the amount of recovery.' Using this standard the insurer, as well as
the insured, can easily determine the amount of insurance to carry
and the amount of recovery to expect in case of loss. The "replace-
ment cost less depreciation" standard achieves indemnity in most cases
by allowing recovery of loss, yet preventing windfalls. 1
The "replacement cost less depreciation" standard has the disad-
vantage, however, of inflexibility.' Under this standard the only
evidence considered to determine the actual cash value is the replace-
ment cost and the amount of depreciation. In unusual situations, the
true commercial value may be much less than the replacement cost
less depreciation.' This standard, however, may prohibit evidence of
47. Smith, 219 Ill. App. at 512.
48. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 322 F.2d 803 (8th Cir. 1963);
Boise Ass'n of Credit Men v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 44 Idaho 249, 256 P. 523 (1927); Smith
V. Allemania Fire Ins. Co., 219 Ill. App. 506 (1920); Lee v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co.,
82 Mont. 264, 266 P. 640 (1928); Reichfield Oil Corp. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 85 Nev. 185, 452
P.2d 462 (1969); Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 366 F. Supp.
749 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Braddock v. Memphis Fire Ins. Corp., - Tenn. -, 493 S.W.2d
453 (1973); Manhattan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Melton, - Tex. __ , 329 S.W.2d 338
(1959); Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 711, 715 (1958).
49. In jurisdictions using the "replacement cost less depreciation" standard,
depreciation has often been limited to physical depreciation rather than obsolescence
or other factors which might reduce the value of the property. Although courts instruct
the jury to consider depreciation, they generally have not instructed the jury as to the
way the amount of depreciation should be ascertained or measured. Courts using the
broad evidence rule, however, are willing to look at all factors that affect value such
as obsolescence. Valuation Under Fire Insurance Policies, supra note 2, at 879.
50. Ingram, Reducing the Incentive for Arson: The "Broad Evidence Rule", 29
DRAKE L. REV. 761, 766 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Ingram].
51. Id.
52. Id. Valuation Under Fire Insurance Policies; supra note 2, at 821. Elberon.
77 N.J. at 10, 389 A.2d at 443.
53. Note, Valuation Under Fire Insurance Policies, supra note 2. at 822; Chicago
Title & Trust Co. v. U.S. Fidelity Guaranty Co., 376 F. Supp. 767, 770 (N.D. Ill. 1973),
1982]
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functional or structural obsolescence,5 a contract to demolish the
building,55 a Contract to sell at a price much less than replacement
cost less depreciation,' a location in a slum neighborhood,57 or simply
an inability to sell the property because of market conditions. 8 When
such evidence is not considered, it may allow recovery greatly in ex-
cess of loss and furnish an incentive for arson.
The problems created by use of the "replacement cost less
depreciation" standard in all cases are exemplified by Chicago Title
& Trust Co. v. U.S. Fidelity Guaranty Co. 59 In that case the insured
purchased a brick building in a Chicago slum neighborhood for $7,000.
The building, insured for $50,000,' was run down, but had an actual
rev'd, 511 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1975); where the building was sold for $7,000, but had a replace-
ment cost of $60,000 ($119,000 less 45% depreciation).
54. A building is considered obsolete when a reasonable owner would not rebuild
it in case of destruction. Ingram, supra note 50, at 766 n.37. Wisconsin Screw Co. v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 193 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Wis. 1960); affd, 297 F.2d 697 (7th Cir.
1962) (where machinery and tools were no longer produced having been replaced by dif-
ferent machines); First Nat'l Bank v. Boston Ins. Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 159, 149 N.E.2d 240
(1958), afjfd, 17 Ill. 2d 147, 160 N.E.2d 802 (1959) (where the building was a twenty-five
room mansion in a slum neighborhood); McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y.
176, 157 N.E. 902 (1928) (where the building was a brewery unusable due to Prohibition
and unadaptable to any other use).
55. Royal Ins. Co. v. Sister of Preservation, 430 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1970); Paterson-
Leitch Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 366 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Gendron
v. Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co., 384 A.2d 694 (Me. 1978), Board of Educ. v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 124 W. Va. 163, 19 S.E.2d 448 (1942).
56. First Nat'l Bank, 17 Ill. App. 2d 159, 149 N.E.2d 240 (1958), afjfd, 17 Ill. 2d
147, 160 N.E.2d 802 (1959); Eagle Square Mfg. Co. v. Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 125
Vt. 221, 212 A.2d 636 (1965).
57. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 376 F. Supp. at 770.
58. Ingram, supra note 50, at 766 n.42.
59. 376 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Ill. 1973), rev'd, 511 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1975).
60. The insurance policy was issued under a Fair Access to Insurance Re-
quirements (FAIR) plan. FAIR plans were implemented in 1968 in an attempt to ameliorate
urban deterioration by providing insurance to property owners denied insurance in the
voluntary market. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 12 U.S.C. S 1749bbb-1-
S 1749bbb-21 (1976) as amended by Pub. L. 95-557, 92 Stat. 2097 (1978). It became ap-
parent that urban areas could not prosper without access to property insurance for busi-
nesses and homeowners, and that many insurers would not insure in these areas due
to the high risk. The theory behind the plan was that if businesses and homeowners
could get insurance they would repair the buildings instead of letting them deteriorate
further. As this case indicates, where the insured can collect a great deal more than
the repaired building would be worth, there may be no incentive for the insured to repair
the building. He may simply keep the money. W*here the difference between the commer-
cial value of the building and the insurance recovery is too great, it becomes a strong
incentive for arson. For a complete discussion of FAIR plans, see FAIR PLANS: History,
Holtzman and the Arson-for-Profit-Hazard, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 617 (1979).
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cash value of $60,500 (replacement cost of $119,500 less 45% deprecia-
tion). The building was damaged by fire, and the owner collected
$18,500 from the insurer, despite the fact that he had paid only $7,000
for it. The owner did not spend the insurance proceeds to repair the
building, but sold it for $4,400. The new owner applied to have the
insurance transferred, but before any action was taken, the building
suffered a second fire. Although the new owner had paid only $400
of the contract price and the building was under a "board and secure
order,"61 the owner sought over $43,000 (the replacement cost less
depreciation).
The Illinois District Court pointed out it would be ludicrous to
allow such a large recovery for an economically useless building. They
also noted, however, that evidence of market value, purchase price,
or economic obsolescence normally were not allowed under the rigid
replacement cost less depreciation test. 2 The court solved the prob-
lem by simply finding the owner had no insurable interest in the
building, although she quite obviously had a nominal interest." On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
the owner did have an insurable interest in the building. 4 The court,
however, refused to allow recovery of "replacement cost less deprecia-
tion," even though that was the standard followed in Illinois. It pointed
out that such recovery would violate the policy of confining insurance
contracts to indemnity:
The policies would be offended by a contract requiring the
insurer to pay the amount of reproduction cost, less
depreciation, in the event of loss when there is a gross
disparity between that amount and the value of the building
measured on any rational basis, such as market value,
economic utility, or utility of the owner. Such a contract
would be predominantly a gambling contract, would reward
and thereby tempt the destruction of property and would
not be confined to indemnity.
61. In this case the city had instituted an action alleging numerous code viola-
tions and seeking demolition of the building. At a hearing in that action the city inspec-
tor testified that the building was vacant and open. The court ordered a "D and H
(dangerous and hazardous) inspection" and continued the hearing. After inspection, the
inspector testified that the building was still open, vacant, severely damaged, and in
a dangerous and hazardous condition. The court then ordered the building to be boarded
and secured. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 511 F.2d at 243.
62. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 376 F. Supp. at 771.
63. Id.
64. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 511 F.2d at 246.
65. Id. at 247.
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The court looked to all the relevant evidence and held that recovery
should be limited to the amount that had been paid on the contract,
any amount still owing, and amounts expended for any repairs. The
court, in effect, solved the problem by applying the broad evidence
rule.
This case, as well as several other Illinois cases, 66 are good ex-
amples of the problems encountered by jurisdictions that use the in-
flexible "replacement cost less depreciation" standard. Blind applica-
tion of this standard may result in recovery in excess of loss in cases
where there are unusual circumstances such as obsolescence.7 Excess
recovery may also occur, even in situations where there are no unusual
circumstances, when "replacement cost" standard, without allowance
for depreciation, is used to define actual cash value.
Replacement Cost
Replacement cost without allowance for depreciation is used to
define actual cash value in a minority of jurisdictions." The jurisdic-
66. Illinois adopted the "replacement cost less depreciation" standard in Smith
v. Allemania Fire Ins. Co., 219 Ill. App. 506 (1920). Consistent with this ruling a federal
court held that intent to tear down a building was a collateral matter having no bearing
on actual cash value. Knuppel v. American Ins. Co., 269 F.2d 163, 166 (7th Cir. 1959).
Even where the owner had actually contracted for demolition of the building, the court
refused to allow such evidence. Garcy Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 490 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1974).
Where, however, the demolition had actually begun, the court recognized that to allow
recovery of replacement cost less depreciation would produce an unjust result. The court
held that the standard did not apply to buildings in the process of demolition since they
had no value. Aetna State Bank v. Maryland Cas. Co., 345 F. Supp. 903 (N.D. I1. 1972).
In a similar case, where there was a contract to demolish and demolition had begun,
the court held the insured had no insurable interest and therefore the standard did not
apply. Lieberman v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 6 Ill. App. 3d 948, 287 N.E.2d 38 (1972). Finally,
in Chicago Trust & Title, the court admitted the insured had a nominal interest, but con-
sidered all the evidence affecting the value of property and in a sense applied the broad
evidence rule.
67. Bailey v. Gulf Ins. Co., 406 F.2d 47 (10th Cir. 1969); American Ins. Co. v.
Treasurer, School Dist. No. 37,273 F.2d 757 (10th Cir. 1959); American Ins. Co. v. Bateman,
125 Ga. App. 189, 186 S.E.2d 547 (1971); Eagle Square Mfg. Co. v. Vermont Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 123 Vt. 221, 212 A.2d 636 (1965).
68. Harper v. Pennsylvania Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 199 F. Supp. 663 (E.D. Va. 1961);
Commercial U. Ins. Co. v. Regals, 355 So. 2d 684 (Ala. 1978); Sperling v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 281 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1973); North River Ins. Co. v. Godley, 55 Ga. 52, 189 S.E.
577 (1936); McIntosh v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 106 Mont. 434, 78 P.2d 82 (1938); Farber
v. Perkiomen Mut. Ins. Co., 370 Pa. 480, 88 A.2d 776 (1952); Farmers Mut. Protective
Ass'n v. Cmerek, 404 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. 1966). Although Third Nat'l Bank v. American
Equitable Ins. Co., 27 Tenn. App. 249, 178 S.W.2d 915 (1943), held that depreciation should
not be deducted in a partial loss case, it was apparently overruled by Braddock v. Mem-
phis Fire Ins. Corp., - Tenn. -, 493 S.W.2d 453 (1973).
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tions using the "replacement cost" standard argue that recovery in-
sufficient to allow the insured to repair or replace the property com-
pletely fails to indemnify the insured. These courts look to the "use"
value of the destroyed property and argue that the property must
be restored to its original condition." This position fails, however, to
recognize that a "fire insurance policy is not a contract to insure pro-
perty against fire, but to insure the owner of the property against
loss by fire"70 When determining the value of the loss, the focus should
be on the loss to the insured, not on the loss to the property.
Actual cash value of property is not necessarily the same as
replacement cost in all situations. If a fifty-year-old house is destroyed
by fire, the loss to the owner is not the cost of replacing the old house
with a new one. If he receives an amount sufficient to replace the
old house with a new one, he has received a windfall, violating the
principle of indemnity." Similarly, if a fifteen-year-old roof, with a life
expectancy of twenty years, blows off a house, the value of the loss
to the owner is not the cost of a new roof.72 If the insured receives
the cost of a new roof, it would result in a net gain and, again, violate
the principle of indemnity.
Since it is almost universally accepted that depreciation must
be deducted from replacement cost in total loss cases," jurisdictions
applying the "replacement cost" standard limit its use to partial loss
cases. These jurisdictions justify the distinction between partial 4 and
total 5 loss cases by the argument that in partial loss cases the pro-
perty is merely repaired and not increased in value. Therefore, there
is no need to deduct depreciation. In total loss cases, on the other
hand, the property is replaced entirely with new material, and is,
therefore, substantially increased in value.6 Thus, a deduction for
depreciation is required.
69. Fedas v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 300 Pa. 555, 563-65, 151 A. 285, 288 (1938).
70. Borden v. General Ins. Co. of America, 57 Neb. 98. - , 59 N.W.2d 141,
147 (1953); Ingram, supra note 50, at 773.
71. Note, An Insurance Policy Providing for Replacement of Fire Damaged Struc-
tures with New Materials, 96 U. PA. L. REV. 841 (1948) [hereinafter cited as An lnsurance
Policy].
72. Williams, infra, note 77, at 478.
73. Valuation Under Fire Insurance Policies, supra note 2, at 823.
74. See note 36 supra.
75. It is a total loss of the building if the parts that remain cannot be utilized
to advantage in restoring the building to the condition it was in before the loss. O'Keefe
v. Insurance Co., 140 Mo. 558, 41 S.W. 922, 923 (1897).
76. Schulman, Insurance Valuation And Adjustment of Fire Losses on Dwellings:
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The distinction between repair and replacement, however, is not
so clear." There are cases where repair will substantially increase
the value of the property. When a fifteen-year-old roof is destroyed
and entirely replaced with a new one, it obviously increases the value
of the property. If the interior of a fifty-year-old house is gutted by
fire, repair of the interior with new materials increases the value of
the house. While these are partial loss cases, there is still the oppor-
tunity for the insured to receive a net gain. If there is no deduction
for depreciation, it creates a "moral hazard" just as the potential for
net gain does in the total loss case.
It is true that where damage is slight and total repair will not
result in significant betterment, the distinction between partial and
total losses may be valid. In those cases there is little justification
for deducting depreciation.7 1 In other cases, however, the distinction
between total and partial losses has been criticized." There are par-
tial loss cases where repair will be extensive enough to result in bet-
terment of the property and give the owner a net gain if no deprecia-
tion is deducted.' Furthermore, using a different measure of recovery
in partial and total loss cases could lead to the anomalous result of
allowing an insured to recover more for a partial loss than for a total
loss.81 If a building insured for $250,000 with an actual cash value of
$200,000 ($500,000 replacement cost less depreciation) sustains a total
loss, the insured would recover $200,000. If there is damage to only
fifty percent of the building, the insured would collect the replace-
ment cost of $250,000 and still have half of a building.2
Unless repairs result in no significant betterment to the proper-
ty, there is no real justification for distinguishing between total and
partial loss. 3 If, as a minority of jurisdictions suggest, recovery of an
amount insufficient to repair or replace the property completely in
California Law v. Southern California Practice, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 248, 256 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Schulman].
77. Williams, The Principle of Indemnity: A Critical Analysis, INs. L.J. 471,478
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Williams].
78. Howland, Depreciation and Partial Losses, INS. L.J. 685, 688-89 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as Howland]; Valuation Under Fire Insurance Policies, supra note
2, at 826.
79. Elberon, 77 N.J. at 14 n.5, 389 A.2d at 445 n.5.
80. Elberon, 77 N.J. at 7-8, 389 A.2d at 443; Braddock, - Tenn. __, 493 S.W.2d
at 460.
81. Cotton, The Factor of Replacement Cost in Fire Insurance, INS. L.J. 34, 37
(1956); Valuation Under Fire Insurance Policies, supra note 2, at 826 n.60.
82. Id.
83. Howland, supra note 78, at 688.
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a partial loss fails to indemnify the insured, it would follow that an
amount insufficient to replace the property in a total loss case would
also fail to indemnify the insured. But it is almost universally recog-
nized that recovery of replacement cost less depreciation indemnifies
the insured in total loss cases.'
On one phase of the question the courts have always been
clear. They have invariably insisted that an old building may
not be valued at its replacement cost new except after the
deduction of an allowance for physical depreciation. This
doctrine is so well recognized that parties desiring a high
valuation no longer take the trouble to challenge it before
a court."5
The 1918 New York standard fire insurance policy expressly stated
that depreciation should be deducted. It insured "to the extent of ac-
tual cash value (ascertained with property deduction for
depreciation)."' The 1918 version was modified by deleting the paren-
thetical clause on depreciation in the 1943 Revision because "actual
cash value cannot be computed without consideration of depreciation." '
It was felt that the phrase "to the extent of actual cash value" was
adequate in itself and capable of no other meaning than that deprecia-
tion was necessarily included in the ascertainment of actual cash
value.8
Use of the replacement cost standard in all partial loss cases
will lead to windfalls and thus furnish an incentive for arson in many
cases. As one court put it:
To allow the insured to recover the original value of real
estate that has depreciated .... would be for the insurance
company to pay for losses that were not caused by the fire.
Such prodigality would simply furnish an incentive for
destruction of property, because more could be recovered
from insurance than the undamaged property was worth.
Even under present conditions, it is found that business
depreciations, which reduce the values of buildings and
stocks in goods, are sometimes accompanied by large in-
84. Valuation Under Fire Insurance Policies, supra note 2, at 823.
85. Bonbright & Katz, Valuation of Property to Measure Fire Insurance Losses,
29 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 863 (1929).
86. 4 BIRDSEYE, CUMMING & GILBERTS CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF N.Y. S 121 (2d ed.
1917).
87. Valuation Under Fire Insurance Policies, supra note 2, at 826 n.60.
88. Note, The 1943 Standard Fire Insurance Policy, 39 ILL. L. REV. 66,70 (1944).
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creases in the fire losses. Such conditions furnish an incen-
tive for fire.89
Under the replacement cost standard, the insured may receive replace-
ment cost of the building even though the true value is much less.
This is clearly contrary to the principle of indemnity.
It has been argued that the replacement cost theory is consis-
tent with the indemnity concept of insurance.9 This argument is bas-
ed on the idea that the insured is being indemnified for the loss of
an object's use value, rather than the value of the life remaining to
the property.9" Under this view the insurer does not fulfill its func-
tion of making the insured whole, if depreciation is deducted from
replacement cost, since it would be impossible for the insured to return
to his former position without additional expense.92
This argument does not stand up to close scrutiny. Regardless
of how it is phrased, the replacement standard contemplates a substitu-
tion of new for old. This does not always give the insured a gain,
as in the case of replacement of three shingles. However, many in-
stances where the insured recovers replacement cost will involve a
"gain potential."93 Gain is always contrary to a strict theory of
indemnity.94
Undeniably, a recovery which is insufficient to completely repair
or replace property after a fire may put a severe financial strain on
an insured when he can least afford it. In response to this, insurers
write what is known as "replacement cost insurance."95 The policies
provide that in the case of loss, the full repair cost will be paid without
deduction for depreciation. Such policies originally called "deprecia-
tion insurance,"' insure for the difference between actual cost value
and replacement cost.97 Replacement cost insurance is more expen-
sive than the standard fire insurance coverage. The fact that such
89. REIGEL & MILLER, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES, 358-59 (3d ed. 1947).
90. Schulman, supra note 76 at 261.
91. Schulman, supra note 76, at 256.
92. Schulman, supra note 76, at 257, Fedas, 300 Pa. at __, 151 A. at 288.
93. Williams, supra note 77, at 473.
94. Id.
95. Columbia College v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 250 S.C. 237,157 S.E.2d 416 (1967).
96. Under depreciation insurance the insured collected cash representing the
amount a property had depreciated in addition to its actual value. If he did not rebuild,
he made a profit. Under replacement insurance he has to repair in order to collect, limiting
the incentive for arson. Valuation Under Fire Insurance Policies, supra note 2, at 832 n.96.
97. Columbia College, 250 S.C. at -, 157 S.E.2d at 423.
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a policy is available, as a distinct, more expensive coverage, indicates
that actual cash value is not synonomous with replacement cost. Fur-
thermore, to recover the full replacement cost under a "replacement
cost" policy, the insured must actually repair or replace the property;
otherwise he is limited to the actual cash value of the property. This,
too, indicates that actual cash value does not mean replacement cost.
Replacement cost policies also have a requirement that insurance on
the building must be a certain percentage (usually eighty to one hun-
dred) of the replacement cost of the building. 8 This requirement im-
poses part of the risk on the insured in the case of partial loss.9
The requirement that the insured actually replace or repair the
property in order to receive the replacement cost limits the incentive
for arson by limiting the opportunity for windfall. If actual cash value
is defined as replacement cost, it effectively transforms all fire in-
surance policies into "replacement policies.""1 ' Unlike true "replace-
ment policies," however, there is no additional premium paid for the
expanded coverage. Nor is there the protective requirement that the
insured must actually repair or replace the property. Transforming
all insurance policies into replacement cost policies will raise insurance
rates for everyone and furnish an incentive for arson.'
Defining actual cash value as replacement cost is also inconsis-
tent with the language and intent of the standard fire insurance
policy.' Such policies insure "to the extent of actual cash value of
the property . . ., but not exceeding the amount it would cost to repair
or replace the property ... .03 Repair or replacement costs are an
upper limit on the insurer's liability, not an absolute measure of
98. Note, An Insurance Policy, supra note 71, at 843.
99. One author has explained the purpose of the coinsurance clause this way:
Insurance rates are based on a definite ratio between insurance and value.
However, where the face amount of a policy is less than the amount necessary
to compensate fully for a total loss, a partial loss will frequently be within
the face amount and will be fully covered. Since most losses are partial,
property owners will tend to underinsure. As a result those who underin-
sure will ordinarily receive for a lower premium protection equal to that
afforded those who insure up to the full amount. In order, therefore, to secure
equitable distribution of fire insurance protection and a fair premium return
from each property owner, coinsurance clauses are employed.
Note, Valuation Under Fire Insurance Policies, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 818, 829 (1949).
100. Elberon Bathing v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 77 N.J. 1,.7,389 A.2d 439, 442 (1978).
Note, An Insurance Policy, supra note 71, at 848.
101. Elberon, 77 N.J. at 8, 389 A.2d at 442.
102. Id.
103. N.Y. INS. LAW S 168(5) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
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recovery."' Equating actual cash value with replacement cost renders
the limiting phrase meaningless.
The majority of jurisdictions require a deduction for deprecia-
tion in partial loss cases. This prevents windfalls and, therefore, follows
the principle of indemnity.,' In situations where repair will not result
in an increase in value, there is little justification for deducting
depreciation. '° Courts generally recognize this exception, but the pro-
blems created by rigid rules could be avoided by use of the broad
evidence rule. °7
The Broad Evidence Rule
In 1928, the New York Supreme Court was required to define
actual cash value. In McAnarney v. Newark Fire Insurance Co., °8 the
insured owned a brewery which he had purchased for $8,000. The
building was no longer used for any purpose due to passage of the
Prohibition Act. The owner had tried to sell it but had failed to receive
any offer over $6,000 because it was unadaptable to any other use.
The building was destroyed by fire and the owner sought recovery
of $42,000. The insurer refused to pay the entire amount and the owner
sued. The insurer argued that the actual cash value was market value
104. Mercer v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 318 So. 2d 111, 115 (La. App. 1975);
McAnarney, 247 N.Y. at 183, 157 N.E. at 904; Elberon, 77 N.J. at __ , 389 A.2d at 442.
But see Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Regals, 355 So. 2d 685, 686 (Ala. 1978) (where the
court held that the actual cash value phrase is a limit on liability, and the limiting phrase
established the measure of recovery as the reasonable cost of repairs). Several Texas
cases hold that the actual cash value phrase is the measure of recovery in total loss cases,
but that in partial loss cases the phrase "but not exceeding the cost to replace or repair"
is the measure of damages. Farmers Mut. Protective Ass'n v. Cmerek, 404 S.W.2d 599
(Tex. 1966); Lerman v. Implement Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 382 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1964); Gulf
Ins. Co. v. Carroll, - Tex. __, 330 S.W.2d 227 (1959).
105. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 322 F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 1963);
Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 366 F. Supp. 749 (NJ). Ohio 1973);
State Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 14 Colo. 499, 24 P. 333 (1890); Boise Ass'n of Credit Men v. U.S.
Fire Ins. Co., 44 Idaho 249, 256 P. 523 (1927); Smith v. Allemania Fire Ins. Co., 219 Ill.
App. 506 (1920); McIntosh v. Home Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 198 Iowa 1038, 200 N.W. 694 (1924);
Great American Ins. Co. v. Crume, 266 Ky. 729, 99 S.W.2d 742 (1936); Schreiber v. Pacific
Coast Fire Ins. Co., 195 Md. 639, 75 A.2d 108 (1950); Nicolson v. Bankers & Shippers Ins.
Co., 164 Miss. 523, 145 So. 349 (1933); Lee v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 82 Mont.
264, 266 P. 644 (1928); Johnstone v. Home Ins. Co., - Mo. - , 34 S.W.2d 1029 (1931);
Voges v. Mechanics Ins. Co., 119 Neb. 553, 230 N.W. 105 (1930); Elberon Bathing v. Am-
bassador Ins. Co., 77 N.J. 1, 389 A.2d 439 (1978); Braddock v. Memphis, - Tenn. __,
493 S.W.2d 453 (1973).
106. Howland, Depreciation and Partial Losses, INS. L.J. 685, 688 (1953).
107. Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 711 (1958).
108. 247 N.Y. 176, 159 N.E. 902 (1928).
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which would include consideration of obsolescence. The trial court in-
structed the jury that actual cash value was the cost to replace the
buildings less physical depreciation and that the building's obsolescence
was wholly immaterial to the determination of actual cash value. The
jury found that the actual cash value -was $55,000. On appeal, the court
held that neither market value or replacement cost less depreciation
was the sole measure of recovery. '°9 The court reasoned:
[W]here insured buildings have been destroyed, the trier
of fact may, and should, call to its aid, in order to effec-
tuate complete indemnity, every fact and circumstance
which would logically tend to the formulation of a correct
estimate of the loss. It may consider original cost and cost
of reproduction; the opinions upon value given by qualified
witnesses; the declarations against interest which may have
been made by the assured; the gainful uses to which the
buildings might have been put; as well as any other fact
reasonably tending to throw light upon the subject.10
Although the McAnarney court was not the first to use the broad
evidence rule, because of the influence of the court the decision led
the way to adoption of the broad evidence rule in many jurisdictions."'
109. Id. at 183, 159 N.E. at 904.
110. Id. at 184, 159 N.E. at 905.
111. The following jurisdictions have expressly adopted the broad evidence rule,
citing McAnarney: Reliance Ins. Co. v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 322 F.2d 803 (8th Cir.
1963); Nebraska Drillers Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 123 F. Supp. 678 (D. Colo. 1954);
Garvey v. Old Colony Ins. Co., 153 F. Supp. 755 (D.N.C. 1957); Harper v. Pennsylvania
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 199 F. Supp. 663 (D. Va. 1961); Castaldi v. Hartford County Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 21 Conn. Supp. 265, 154 A.2d 247 (1959); Worchester Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Eisenberg,
147 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1962); Lumberman's Underwriting Alliance v. Jessup, 100 Ga. App.
518, 112 S.E.2d 337 (1959); Britven v. Occidental Ins. Co., 234 Iowa 682, 13 N.W.2d 791
(1944); American States Ins. Co. v. Mo-Lex, Inc., 427 S.W.2d (Ky. 1968); Gendron v.
Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co., 409 A.2d 656 (Me. 1979); Schreiber v. Pacific Coast Fire Ins.
Co., 195 Md. 639, 75 A.2d 108 (1950); Agoos Leather Co. v. American and Foreign Ins.
Co., 342 Mass. 603, 174 N.E.2d 652 (1961); Brooks Realty, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 276 Minn.
245, 149 N.W.2d 494 (1967); Lee v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 82 Mont. 264, 266
P. 640 (1928); Pinet v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 100 N.H. 346, 126 A.2d 262 (1956);
Elberon Bathing Co. v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 77 N.J. 1, 389 A.2d 439 (1978); McAnarney
v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 176, 159 N.E. 902 (1928); Butler v. Aetna Ins. Co., 64
N.D. 764, 256 N.W. 214 (1934); National-Ben Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Short, 207 Okla.
673, 252 P.2d 495 (1953); Lampe Market Co. v. Alliance Ins. Co., 71 S.D. 120, 22 N.W.2d
427 (1946); Fulton Fire Ins. Co., 315 S.W.2d 9 (Tenn. App. 1958); Crisp v. National Ins.
Co., 369 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. 1963); Eagle Square Mfg. Co. v. Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
125 Vt. 221, 212 A.2d 636 (1965); Morgan v. Union Automobile Ins. Co., 150 Wash. 443,
273 Pac. 527 (1929); Board of Educ. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 124 W. Va. 163, 19 S.E.2d
448 (1942); Doelger & Kirsten, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 42 Wis. 2d 518, 167
N.W.2d 198 (1969).
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When evidence of all relevant factors is allowed, the insured
recovers for his loss, but does not receive a windfall. Actual cash value
is then defined as economic value rather than replacement cost.112 The
broad evidence rule does not prevent consideration of market value
or replacement cost less depreciation. Such factors may be considered
along will all other evidence, and under certain circumstances either
of those standards may be used alone. 3 Market value and replace-
ment cost are guides in making the determination, rather than
"shackles.1 1 4  Under the broad evidence rule, evidence of
obsolescence,"' contracts for sale,"6 or demolition1 7 may be considered
to prevent windfalls that could occur under the rigid "replacement
cost less depreciation" test. 8 Similarly, the court can allow evidence
that will increase the value of the property. 9
Under the broad evidence rule, if a party has competent evidence
that shows the inadequacy of the market value or replacement cost
less depreciation, the jury will be allowed to consider the special cir-
cumstances. This results in a more equitable distribution of insurance
proceeds and furthers the public policy which favors indemnity.
There are arguments against using the broad evidence rule. It
is not as definite as the replacement cost standard. For example, no
exact figure as to the value of property is available when insurance
is acquired. This may result in violations of the public policy against
over- and under-insuring property." However, in the majority of cases
112. McAnarney, 247 N.Y. at 184, 159 N.E. at 905.
113. Elberon, 77 N.J. at 13, 389 A.2d at 444.
114. American States Ins. Co. v. Mo-Lex, Inc., 427 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Ky. 1968).
115. See note 54 infra. Wisconsin Screw Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 193 F.
Supp. 96 (E.D. Wis. 1960), affd, 297 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1962); McAnarney, 247 N.Y. 176,
159 N.E. 902 (1928).
116. Eagle Square Mfg. Co. v. Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 125 Vt. 221, 212 A.2d
636 (1965) (where court allowed evidence of contract for sale).
117. Royal Ins. Co. v. Sister of Preservation, 430 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1970); Gen-
dron v. Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co., 384 A.2d 694 (Me. 1978) (where the court allowed evidence
of a lease which called for gas station to be razed within a year); Board of Educ. v. Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co., 124 W. Va. 163, 19 S.E.2d 448 (1942).
118. Barley v. Gulf Ins. Co., 406 F.2d 47 (10th Cir. 1969) (refusal to admit evidence
of city order to demolish); American Ins. Co. v. Treasurer, School Dist. No. 37, 273 F.2d
757 (10th Cir. 1959) (refusal to admit evidence of plan to demolish); Paterson-Leitch Co.
v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 366 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
119. Eshan Realty Corp. v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 25 Misc. 2d 828, 202 N.Y.S.2d
899 (1960), modified on other grounds, 12 A.D. 2d 818, 210 N.Y.S.2d 256 (1961), where the
court allowed evidence that the building might be renovated into a very useful property
to enter into computation of actual cash value, even though the building had previously
been abandoned.
120. Arson Fraud, supra note 26, at 572.
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where there are no unusual circumstances surrounding the property,
the replacement cost less depreciation figure will probably reflect a
figure close to the "value" of the property. Most insurers use this
figure to estimate insurance needs and in determining the value of
the loss. 2'
Some opposed to the broad evidence rule have expressed fear
that consideration of other factors might "open a field of speculation
and conjecture that would cloud the issue of actual loss in a maze
of collateral issues.""ln However, evidence that comes in under the
broad evidence rule must meet the same tests that all evidence must
meet."' If such evidence is not relevant to the issue or is too
speculative, it will not be admitted. The judge must rule on the suffi-
ciency of evidence under many circumstances during any trial. Thus,
the broad evidence rule raises no unique problems, but simply
augments the usual methods of determining loss. For example, when
obsolescence is pleaded, if there is insufficient evidence, then the
evidence may not be heard by the jury.
Others argue that the insurer should not be allowed to take ad-
vantage of collateral issues to escape liability." They argue that since
the insurers have been paid for the risk, often for many years, they
should not escape paying the entire amount of the policy when there
is a loss. If an insured has paid for $40,000 worth of insurance, it
is posited that the insurer should not escape payment of the full
amount by showing that the building is in a deteriorated neighborhood
and the insured could not sell it for more than $10,000, or that the
insured has actually contracted to sell it for $2,000. While there may
be some merit to this argument, it should be emphasized that the
face value of the policy is not the measure of recovery, but a limit
on insurers' liability.'2 5 Suppose, for example, a person has contracted
to sell his house for $20,000 and it is destroyed by fire before the
contract is executed. It is difficult to argue that he has actually lost
more than $20,000, regardless of the amount for which it is insured.
It should be reemphasized that insurance policies are contracts
of indemnity. The focus when determining the value of loss should
121. Valuation Under Fire Insurance Policies, supra note 99, at 835.
122. American Ins. Co. v. Treasurer, School Dist. No. 37, 273 F.2d 757, 759 (10th
Cir. 1959); Ingram, supra note 48, at 835.
123. Marcus, Actual Cash Value, Illinois and the Broad Evidence Rule: "A Modest
Proposal," 59 ILL. B.J. 1000, 1013-14 (1971).
124. First Nat'l Bank, 17 Ill. App. 2d at 170, 149 N.E.2d at 424.
125. Borden v. General Ins. Co. of America, 157 Neb. 98, -, 59 N.W.2d 141,
148 (1953).
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be on the loss to the insured, not on the loss to the property. It may
be true that insurers are ostensibly receiving a windfall if they are
allowed to pay less than the full amount of the policy. However,
because a "moral hazard" is created by allowing the insured to recover
in excess of his loss, allowing the insurer to pay less than the full
amount seems to be the lesser of two evils. The insured has been
compensated for his actual loss. If the insurer receives the windfall,
theoretically it should benefit all insureds by reducing insurance costs.
Allowing the insured to receive the windfall creates an incentive for
arson and increases the cost of insurance for everyone.
Certainly, the insurer should not be able to grossly overinsure
and then escape liability by showing the property is worth much less."
126. Valued policy laws were originally passed to discourage the insurer from
overinsuring property. See Alexander, The Wisconsin Valued Policy Law, 10 WIs. L. REV.
248 (1935). However, valued policies have generally been criticized as violating the prin-
ciple of indemnity since they allow an insured to recover a set amount, regardless of
the actual value of the property. See KEETON, supra note 17, at S 3.8. Keeton suggests
that the principle of indemnity would be better served if valued policy laws were repealed.
Although the treatment of the problem of overinsurance is beyond the scope of
this Note, it may be noted that theories of waiver or estoppel might apply to insurers
to bind them to the value of the property as represented by the face value of the in-
surance. See Schulman, Insurance Valuation and Adjustment of Fire Losses on Dwellings:
California Law v. Southern California Practice, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 248,253-54 (1958). 17
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE S 9565 (1945). Estoppel has been applied to the in-
surer in cases where the agent has incorrectly filled in the insurance application as well
as to proof of loss cases. Similarly, waiver has been applied to bind the insurer to the
agent's waiver in cases of increased hazard, proof of loss, and even waiver of the policy
provision barring waiver. These theories have not been applied to the area of valuation
in actual litigation. However, one could argue that since the agent usually suggests or
determines the amount of insurance, the insurer is estopped to deny the amount of in-
surance as the value of the property; or that the insurer waived its right to insist on
another measures of value.
In Smith v. Aetna Ins. Co., __ Mo. __, 269 S.W. 682 (1924), the court held that
the insurer was estopped to deny the value placed on the property by the agent. However,
this was a valued policy where the law explicitly provided that the face amount of the
policy is the value of the property. The case of the open policy would seem to present
a different question. In Triel v. National Liberty Ins. Co., 71 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Pa. 1947),
the insured asked the insurer to appraise the replacement cost of the property and the
insurer did so. Three years later when the property burned, the insurer appraised the
replacement cost at a higher amount. The insured argued that the insurer should be
estopped to deny the replacement cost it had set earlier. The court held, however, that
the replacement cost of property changes, and that the initial appraisal was valid only
for that day. In Borden v. General Ins. Co., 157 Neb. 98, 59 N.W.2d 141 (1953), the court
held that under an open policy the amount of the policy was not equivalent to the value
of property, but was only an upper limit on recovery. It held that the insurance agent's
statement as to the value of the property did not bind the insurer and could not be admit-
ted into evidence. Schulman argues that the agreed-upon full amount of coverage should
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 3 [1982], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol16/iss3/3
INVITATION TO ARSON
Generally, any tendency to overinsure is limited to some extent by
the fact that any time an insured fails to recover the full amount of
the policy after a total loss, it is bad publicity for the insurer." Fur-
thermore, most insurers feel that litigation of a claim is likely to result
in the jury awarding the face value of the policy.'28
The trend is toward the use of the broad evidence rule. Courts
recognize the advantages of using it. As one court summarized:
To put the matter in other words, the courts, when faced
with a choice between applying some standardized rigid rule
such as replacement cost minus physical depreciation or of
adopting some more flexible test which can be modified in
such a way as to accord more nearly with the principle of
indemnity, have generally preferred the latter alternative
even though it has involved the sacrifice of administrative
convenience and of simplicity."
The use of rigid rules, such as the Travelers decision advocates, leads
to excess recovery in many cases and "invites" arson.
PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE INDIANA DECISION
In Travelers," the court purported to define actual cash value
as replacement cost without allowance for depreciation. It acknow-
ledged that fire insurance contracts are contracts of indemnity
whereby the insurer "undertakes to make the insurerd whole for the
loss of the insured property caused by fire.""' The court reasoned
that the purpose and functional efficiency of the property must be
considered in defining actual cash value. It held that payment of an
amount which is insufficient to restore or replace the functional effi-
ciency provided by the property before the loss does not comply with
the undertaking to make the insured whole."'
The court was actually arguing that indemnity requires replace-
ment of the property in all cases. It failed to acknowledge that the
purpose of insurance is to insure the owner, not the property, against
at least bind the company as a starting point in the adjustment procedure. Schulman,
supra note 76, at 255.
127. Valuation Under Fire Insurance Policies, supra note 99, at 833 n.108.
128. Id.
129. Pinet v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 100 N.H. 346,126 A.2d 262, 265 (1956).
130. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong, - Ind. App. - , 384 N.E.2d 607
(1979).
131. Id. at -, 384 N.E.2d at 613.
132. Id. at -' 384 N.E.2d at 615.
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loss. " ' The court was, in effect, arguing that the property should be
made whole, not just the insured.
The principle of indemnity requires that the insured be put in
the same position financially as he would have been had no fire oc-
curred. The insured must not be put in a better position.'"' If the
insured is to receive an amount sufficient to replace the property in
every case, there will be many situations where the insured will
receive a windfall.135
Although Travelers dealt with a partial loss, the court did not
limit use of the "replacement cost" standard to partial loss cases, as
the other jurisdictions following the minority view have done. If pure
replacement cost is to be the standard followed in all cases, it will
lead to windfall profits or at least net gain in many cases. Anyone
that has property which has depreciated due to age, decay of the
neighborhood, functional obsolescence, or merely a slow economy will
stand to receive a net gain if that property is destroyed by fire. Cer-
tainly this situation furnishes an invitation to arson. 1m
The seriousness of this possibility cannot be understated. 31 In
four years the number of estimated arson cases had quadrupled."
Members of Congress have urged enactment of federal legislation to
enhance public awareness of the dimension of the arson problem."
The social cost of arson includes not only loss of human life, but also
higher insurance premiums, loss of revenues and jobs, and further
deterioration of urban areas. The problem is especially serious in the
slum neighborhoods of large cities, where the decay of property itself
has furnished an incentive for arson. The homeowner who cannot sell
his house because of the neighborhood or the businessman who has
lost so much business he can no longer meet expenses may simply
decide to "sell" his property to the insurance company. As a practical
matter, the temptation is great when such people may actually
generate a gain from such a losing proposition. The risks are so great
in decayed inner city areas that insurers are reluctant or refuse to
insure homeowners or businesses in those neighborhoods.' 0 These
133. See note 70 supra, and accompanying text.
134. See note 89 supra, and accompanying text.
135. See note 33 supra, and accompanying text.
136. See note 89 supra, and accompanying text.
137. See note 1 supra, and accompanying text.
138. Ryan, The Arson Triangle, 14 FORUM 184 (1978).
139. Karp, supra note 1, at 205.
140. FAIR Plans: History, Holtzman and the Arson-for-Profit Hazard, 7 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 617 (1979).
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problems are only aggravated by use of a single rigid standard in
all cases. While there are cases where the "replacement cost" stan-
dard will achieve indemnity, there are many cases where it will allow
excess recovery.
Limiting the decision to partial losses does not completely solve
the problem.' There is no valid reason for making the distinction
between partial and total loss cases except in the case where repair
will not result in an increase in value;4" this is the only instance where
a deduction for depreciation is not necessary to avoid creation of a
moral hazard. But this exception hardly justifies recovery of replace-
ment cost for all losses or even for all partial losses. Defining actual
cash value as replacement cost in all cases turns all fire insurance
policies into "replacement cost" policies." This is certain to raise in-
surance premiums for everyone in Indiana. The consumer will suffer
if this decision stands; he ultimately pays for the cost of arson through
higher premiums.
It may well be that the facts in the Travelers case warranted
an award of pure replacement cost.'" Had the court adopted the broad
evidence rule, it could have considered all the evidence and simply
decided that in this particular case no deduction for depreciation was
necessary. Use of the broad evidence rule does not preclude use of
market value, replacement cost less depreciation, or even replacement
cost. It merely allows all evidence to be considered and the standard
which most nearly accomplishes indemnity in the particular case to
be applied. But unlike using one rigid standard in all cases, using the
broad evidence rule prevents windfalls by allowing all evidence rele-
vant to a determination of value.
The Travelers court did not decide that the relevant evidence
141. Howland, Depreciation and Partial Losses, INS. L.J. 685, 685 n.1 (1953).
142. See note 78 supra, and accompanying text.
143. See note 95 supra, and accompanying text. It is interesting to note that the
insured's home in the Travelers case was covered by a "replacement cost" policy while
the rental property involved in the case was covered under a standard fire insurance
policy. This points out the irony of defining actual cash value in standard fire insurance
policies as replacement cost. The insured paid less for the coverage on the rental property
and would not have been required to repair the property in order to receive the replace-
ment cost. Yet, she would receive the same recovery as she would under the replacement
policy in the event of loss.
144. It is not the purpose of this note to criticize the amount of the award in
the Travelers case. It is possible that under the broad evidence rule the amount of recovery
would have been the same. It may well have been that the replacement would not result
in significant increase in the value of the property or that the remodeling was so exten-
sive and so recent that no deduction for depreciation was justified.
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in that particular case required use of the replacement cost. It did
not limit use of the replacement standard to partial loss cases. The
court held "that actual cash value, within the context of the fire in-
surance policy in the case at bar, means an amount of money ...
sufficient to restore, repair, or replace the property destroyed."'' 5 The
fire insurance policy in Travelers was the standard fire insurance policy
used by all insurers in Indiana. Therefore, actual cash value in all
Indiana fire insurance policies means replacement cost.
There is some question, however, whether the Travelers court
intended replacement cost to be the sole standard in all situations.
In future cases, it may be argued that the court intended to adopt
the broad evidence rule. The court considered not only replacement
cost, but also depreciation, extent and date of remodeling, functional
efficiency of the property, and expert opinion of market value. If the
court was using pure replacement cost, most of this evidence was
technically irrelevant. All of it, however, would be relevant under the
broad evidence rule. If the court adopted the broad evidence rule,
it could allow use of the pure replacement cost standard when it was
justified. It would also allow the jury to consider evidence of deprecia-
tion, obsolescence, contracts for sales, and contracts to demolish,
thereby preventing windfall recoveries.
The use of the broad evidence rule is not, however, consistent
with the flat statement that "the phrase actual cash value, within the
context of the fire insurance policy in the case at bar means an amount
sufficient to restore, repair, or replace the property destroyed."'" Nor
is it consistent with the jury instruction that the "policy contained
no provisions which required or authorized a reduction of coverage
below the amount of the full direct loss.'' 14 These rigid rules are simply
inconsistent with the flexible standard of the broad evidence rule.
This conflict between the standard the Travelers court purported
to apply and the standard which the court actually seemed to apply
leaves serious question as to what standard is to be used in Indiana.
The Supreme Court must clarify what the standard is in Indiana. It
is urged that adoption of the broad evidence rule would achieve in-
demnity and equitable distribution of insurance proceeds in the ma-
jority of cases. Therefore, the court should follow the majority of
jurisdictions and adopt that rule. If the court refuses to adopt the
145. Travelers, __ Ind. App. at - , 384 N.E.2d at 615.
146. Travelers, __ Ind. App. - , 384 N.E.2d at 615.
147. Id. at __, 384 N.E.2d at 616.
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broad evidence rule, it should limit the use of the pure replacement
standard to partial loss cases where damage is slight and recovery
of full replacement cost will not result in significant betterment. There
is simply no precedent for applying a pure replacement cost standard
in all cases.
CONCLUSIONS
The insurance contract is a contract of indemnity. Therefore,
actual cash value should be defined so as to allow an insured to recover
his loss, but prevent net gain. The Travelers definition of actual cash
value as replacement cost fails to do so. It allows the insured to
recover in excess of his loss in many cases. Thus, the Indiana Court
of Appeals created an "invitation to arson."
The Indiana Supreme Court should adopt an interpretation of
actual cash value that avoids this result. The "replacement cost less
depreciation" standard works well in many cases, but in certain situa-
tions it, too, allows excess recovery. The "market value" standard,
on the other hand, often fails to indemnify the insured for his loss.
In contrast, the broad evidence rule allows the court to consider all
the evidence. This leads to an equitable distribution of insurance pro-
ceeds and achieves indemnity in the majority of cases. Therefore, the
court should explicitly adopt the broad evidence rule and limit the
use of the replacement cost standard to cases where repair will not
result in significant betterment.
If the Supreme Court upholds the Court of Appeals, it should
clarify exactly what standard is to be used in future cases. It should
specifically state whether the Court of Appeals adopted the broad
evidence rule and define the limits, if any, on the use of the "replace-
ment cost" standard. The decision, as it stands now, constitutes an
"invitation to arson."
Carol Kaesebier
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